






"Légal incentives for environmental management? Nonsense!"
My colleagues' statement was categorical. "Look" he said and
pointed at the dry Sahelian scenery around vis/ where women
were tilling thé fields with a hoe:" The sou is poor, the rains
are poor, thé people are poor and they hâve poor tools. What
they need to better manage their land and natural resources is
technical innovations and economie incentives." With my legal
background I feit challenged and started to défend arguments
that laws, rules and institutions actually are important
incentives for local management of natural resources. The
question is whether the present literature provides évidence for
such an argument. Contrary to the rather provocative Statement
cited above, the answer is not categorically positive but much
more variegated.^
This article intends to explore the possibilities and limits of law
and institutions as instruments for generating changes in
environmental behaviour. In thé following I will first give an
overview of the different schools regarding law and natural
resources. Then expériences from différent developing countries
with emphasis on Africa will be analyzed. Finally, in thé
conclusion, thé relative effectiveness of légal and institutional
incentives for local environmental management will be
discussed.
11 am indebted to Trond Vedeld and Paul Mathieu for their conunents on
thé draft version of trus article.
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But let me start with a good scientific habit and briefly identify
some key concepts employed in this article.
Concepts and Définitions
It is difficult to find a generally accepted définition of incentive.
Instead, différent types of incentives are distinguished along
with proper définitions. Van Campen (1992 : 85) distinguishes
incentives in a wider sensé and incentives in thé more restrictive
sensé. For thé first type he quotes thé two following définitions :
"Something that incites, or has a tendency to incite to
détermination or action : something (as fear or hope for rewards)
that constitutes a motive or spur" (Webster 1976).
"Any stimulus positively influencing thé willingness and/or
potential of an individual or organization to undertake a
'desired' action, or to abandon an 'undesired' action" (PLAE,
1991).
According to Van Campen, incentives in thé more restricted sensé
are generally distinguished in:
• économie incentives which influence peoples' behaviour
through market priées;
• non-économie incentives which influence peoples behaviour
mainly by administrative and juridical régulation.
A third subdivision of incentives is in external and internai.
Smith (1994: 2) defines external incentives as:
"Inducements derived from a source outside thé community,
which hâve a direct or indirect financial value, and are
intended to bring about a change of behaviour in thé récipients."
For him an incentive implies a transitional measure which i s
withdrawn once a desired change is established. Smith states
that thé incentive should be a 'catalyst' for thé desired change
of behaviour and not the cause of thé change. This suggests that
thé ingrédients for change are there but need an external starter
agent (catalyst) in thé form of an incentive. The ingrédients for
change refer to motivations that are normally présent and,
through incentives within thé community, generate change in
behaviour. However, such internai incentives can be weak e.g.
due to a lack of coopération or consensus among community
members. Under thèse circumstances outside support would
primarily focus on he capacity of a community to generate
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incentives when change in behaviour is needed. Sargent e.a.
(1994: 155) make a distinction between positive and négative
incentives :
"Incentives may best be thought of as signais. They may be
négative - disincentives - providing an alert or déterrent, or they
may be positive, motivating and indicating action".
We now may define légal and institutional incentives as
juridical and administrative régulations which influence
peoples' behaviour. They may emanate from thé State (in thé
case of national législation), from thé local Community
(indigenous laws) or from a project ("project law"). But even
though thé State is often considered by local communities as an
external and distant agent, we may not define state law as an
external incentive, because législation is an intégral part of
processes of conservation and change in society, it is not an
autonomous force acting on those processes. When Smith states
that an incentive is withdrawn once a desired change i s
established, this does not always apply to legal and
institutional incentives, which are in principle intended to last.
Before saying something about thé adjectives "légal and
institutional", it is important to remember that in some more
récent publications thé concept of natural resource management
has simply been enlarged to environmental management, often
without explanation. I will mainly focus on thé management of
natural resources, such as land, forests, pastures, watersheds and
so on. Ih this respect tenure, that is the terms and conditions en
which land and other natural resources are held, is a key
concept. (IFAD1993: 3)
Following thé well known définition of Uphoff (1986: 8-9), thé
terms institutions and rules are closely linked : "An institution is
a complex of noms and behaviours that persist over time by
serving collectively values purposes. An organization is a
structure of recognized and accepted rôles." In thé définition of
land tenure Systems by Reyna and Downs (1988: 9) this
interrelationship is even more apparent: "Land tenure Systems
may be thought of as sets of rules - at some times customs, a t
others laws - concerning peoples rights to land, together with
thé institutions that administer thèse rights and thé résultant
ways in which people hold the land." Thomson (1992) analyzes
institutions as sets of rules, but according to him : "The concept of
institutions includes both organizations and rules regarding
behaviour in an area."
Thus, thé two aspects, "law and institutions" and
"organizations" are distinctive features in local management. In
this article thé main focus will be on the first aspect.
Organizational aspects, however, form an intégral part of the
question and more particularly so because, as we will see in thé
next section, the recent trend in environmental policies is
decentralization, thé dévolution of power to local communities.
Théories and Trends in Local
Environmental Management
The interrelationship between légal Systems and local
environmental management is generally accepted. Incentives and
disincentives for sustained management or dégradation of
resources are generated by the economie characteristics of the
resources and by thé rules - or institutions - that structure how
resources are governed, managed and used2. Talking more
specifkally about national legal Systems, Michael Cernea (1994:
189) states: "Such macrosocietal tools as the state, its policies,
the centrally instituted légal System, and fiscal levers are to
guarantee, reinforce, and stiffen the backbone of even the lowest
local resource management System." This, however, does not
mean that there exist spécifie théories dealing with légal and
institutional incentives for local management of natural
resources. Thus, for a discussion of this topic, we hâve to scrounge
from two bodies of social-scientific theory.
The theory of thé "social working of law" has been elaborated in
recent years in the sociology and anthropology of law. 3 It looks
at légal régulation from thé point of view of the local actor
whose behaviour is to be regulated and poses as its central
question: under which drcumstances can légal régulation be
expected to hâve an effect on this actor's behaviour, considering
all the other features of thé local situation of which thé actor
must take account in making behavioural choices?
2 Thomson 1992:1.
3 See e.g. Griffiths 1992,1995.
Gerti Hesseling Légal and Institutional.
102
The second body of socio-légal theory concerns property or
tenure.In this respect the characteristics inherent of the various
types of natural resources play a décisive rôle. With regard to
land tenure in a more broader sense, it is possible to distinguish
two schools advocating a slightly different approach but
resulting in a rather comparable outcome. For the first one, more
anglo-american orientated, the Land Tenure Center in Madison
(USA) may be considered as représentative, whereas the
francophone mainstream is represented by a network of
researchers assembled in the Association pour la Promotion de
Recherches et Etudes foncières en Afrique (APREFA), The
theory of "the management of communal natural resources" has
mainly been developed by institutional economists. It addresses
"thé various ways in which communities can regulate thé use of
their natural resources, the circumstances in which différent
forms of régulation can succeed, and thé conséquences for a
Community of thé différent forms of régulation and of failure
effectively to manage its natural resources".4
The theory of thé social working of law will help us to better
understand why a particular légal incentive intended to improve
thé management of local resources not always has thé expected
results and sometimes even produces undesired and undesirable
side-effects. It focuses on thé shop-floor of social life, thé place
where thé activities which thé legislator would regulate are
taking place. The central question then, is not the intention of
thé lawmaker, but what thé man or woman on the shop floor
actually will do. The answer to this question is not an easy one.
Several factors have to be taken in account 5. First, thé attitude
of farmers, cattle breeders or woodcutters with respect to land,
pastures or forests are also determined by social relationships :
gender, power relations, status and so on. Second, before thé légal
message included in the law reaches the (wo)man in the field, i t
is subjected to various transformations by interprétation or
misinterpretation. And third, management and exploitation of
natural resources are not subject to just one single, coherent body of
légal concepts and rules, but to plural normative Systems (state
law, indigenous law, religieus laws and sometimes also project
law) : societies are characterized by legal pluralism 6. To make
4 Taaie & Griffiths 1995 : 7.
5 Griffiths 1992.
6 Von Benda Beckmann, 1991:78.
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it even more complex, Von Benda Beckmann continues: "Over '
time, both state laws and traditional laws have changed (
considerably, and hybrid forms of local régulation, made up of,_
éléments of various Systems, have developed in many Third!
World régions."
The theory of the social working of law warns us that
lawmaking as such cannot always play the rôle of "catalyst" for
the desired change of environmental behaviour in local
communities. It allows us to better understand the presented
expériences with juridical and administrative régulations for
natural resources management.
Let me now give a brief description of theoretical trends with
regard to land tenure and the évolution of thinking about the
roïe of law and institutions in their relation to land dégradation.
In the recent volume edited by Bassett and Crummey (1993), land
dégradation is linked to insecurity of tenure. In his contribution
to this volume John Bruce describes the ideologically based '
assumption that indigenous tenure Systems lead to tenure
insecurity and thus constrain farmer innovation and investment.
The conséquences of this assumption in the African context has
lead to two types of land reform: "Reformers in the capitalist
mode seek tenure individualization and füll private ownership
of land (through élimination of Community or kin group land
management), while socialist reformers seek state ownership
and control over allocation of land and, in their more
thoroughgoing reforms, collective production in communal
villages or on state farms." 7 The most powerful supporter of the
private property school is the World Bank currentiy funding a
new series of land titling and cadastral projects. 8
In both scénarios, the ideology of (either State or private)
property has its logical corollary that local land tenure
practices are officially ignored, abolished or under-estimated :
the State claims the right to control the management of all land,
even if it does not have the capacity to do so effectively.
7 Bruce 1993:36.




Secondly, the weight of centralism and bureaucratie hierarchy
is crushing. 9
In recent research on land tenure, particularly in Africa, these
key features of modem land law Systems - the déniai of the
potential of local land tenure practices and their centralistic
character - have been identified as important explanatory
factors for the fact that modern land laws often provide little
incentive to investment as they pro vide few safeguards 1<-).
The numerous misconceptions of the indigenous land tenure
's Systems have been extensively demonstrated (Le Bris e.a. 1982 on
i the notion of the "precolonial referent"; Moore 1986 on the notion
j of 'customary' law as a cultural construct with political
s implications; Bruce 1988, 1993 for a balanced analysis of local
J land rights; Berry 1989 on thé relationship between Jpcial
lidentity, political powers and local landrights, and many
IHhers). They ail emphasize thé adaptive flexibility of local
tenure practices and their adjusting capacity to changing
demands of the environment, pointing out at the same time not to
overestimate this ability and not to forget that they sometimes
involve social inequalities. The concentration en a free land
market and the subséquent privatization of land rights,
advocated by the World Bank is, in this view, rarely an
adequate answer to the land dégradation problem.
Qn the basis of his analysis, Bruce questions the viability and
cost-effectiveness of radical law reforms and advocates the
exploration of communify-based solutions to tenure insecurity
and a "state-facilitated" évolution of indigenous land tenure
systems11. This means a more decentralized lawmaking process
with more lawmaking authority for local communities. Le Roy,
confronted with the extreme complexity of African landholding
practices, identified 20 possible mechanism for regulating
human relationships with land, depending on the degree of
control over the resource and the way it was used 12. He
therefore concludes that the unitarian model of national land
9 Hesseling & Ba, 1994.
10 Thébaud 1995:15.
11 Bruce 1993: 51.
12 Le Roy 1992, cited by Thébaud 1995: 6.
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laws is doomed to failure and in fact rejoins Bruce's
recommendations.
In conclusion, according to the socio-légal theory of land tenure, a
prerequisite for légal incentives in local land management is
that they are flexible and adapted to fit the various local
tenure practices. Conversely, the World Bank and its proponents
argue that private property is a key incentive for farmers to
invest in land improvements.
Finally, to which extend the theory of the common property
resources may contribute to a better understanding of legal and
institutional incentives in local environmental management?
Common property resources refer to a variety of collectively-
used natural resources including forests, pastures and water. The
theory of the common property resources has its starting point in
one of the most influential (and according to some people the
most overestimated) papers on the subject The Tragedy of the
Gommons, written in 1968 by a professor of biology, Garrett
Hardin. In his view, the tragedy is that, as population grow,
users of resources held in common will inevitably overexploit
and dégrade those resources. In his own words (p. 1244): "Ruin is
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." For Hardin
the solution was tenure reform to something resembling private
property.
Over the last 20 years, a literature critical of Hardin's theory
has developed ^, culminating in the volume edited by Daniel
Bromley "Making the Commons Work" (1992). Contrary to
Hardin's oversimplified pessimism, those critics argue that, and
I quote Bromley (1992 :4) : "(T)he world is replète with
reasonably successful common-property regimes. By 'successful' I
mean that the natural resource has not been squandered, that
some level of investment in the natural resource has occured, and
that the coowners of the resource are not in a perpétuai state of
anarchy." A major contribution to a better understanding of the
working of the commons is the différence between "open-access
resources" over which no property rights have been recognized
13 See for an example on Sahelian pastures Marty, 1985 and on oomman
pool resources in Indian villages Wade, 1987 and 1988.
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and "common property resources", a set of ordered institutional
arrangements that define the conditions of access to, and control
over, a stream of benefits arising from collectively-used natural
resources.14 Other resources are managed and controlled as state
property or private property.
At the basis of a cost-benefit-analysis, the theory of the common
property resources arrivés to more or less similar conclusions
with regard to légal questions as the socio-légal theorists : for
most common-pool resources, there exist already local rules and
customs, and if new rules have to be introduced, it is important
that they do not vary dramatically from the existing repertoire
of rules in use.15
At the organizational level, Ostrom gives an extended list of
conditions conducive to the émergence of common property users
organizations (called appropriator organizations), those
necessary for the émergence of coordinated stratégies to use a
common property resource, and those that may be conducive to
the survival of such an organization. For the purpose of this
article, I underline the condition that local organizations have
to be nested within a set of larger organizations and authorities
for dealing with problems beyond the boundaries of the
organization. Although it is recommended that authority over
resources should be devolved to local authorities or user groups,
it must be admitted that they are often unable to generate
sufficient sanction locally to enforce rules. Therefore local and
state "co-management" will improve collective resource
management1^.
To conclude, the overall trend with regard to land and common
property resources is orientated towards:
1. a bottom-up / sociological approach of the lawmaking
process;
2. dévolution óf powers to local communities in a setting of co-
management.
14 Swallow and Bromley 1992 :2.
15 Ostrom 1992: 313-314; see also Matowanyika 1991 who states that




Over the last several years, a case study literature ha s
developed which examines the different legal and institutional
stratégies to improve the management of natural resources in
developing countries. In the literature available to me, genera!
environmental case studies on Africa are obviously an
overwhelming majority. This is without doubt due to my own
geographical interest, but there may be another more objective
explanation, expressed by Platteau (1991:3) : "Till the beginning
of the seventies the attention of land reforms was almost
exclusively focussed on Latin America and Asia, while Africa
was commonly considered as 'a special case' thanks to her
abundant land endowments and to the flexibility of her
indigenous land tenure institutions." Another striking feature in
the case study literature is the attention given to problems of
forestry management in developing countries. Generally
speaking this attention may be explained by the high value
attributed to trees and forests with regard to a sound
environment, whereas the market value of wood is also high. In
Africa the expansion in agriculture and an increase in demand for
fuelwood and charcoal contribute to the focus on forestry.
In this section I will examine the available case studies with a
focus on two, partly overlapping issues derived from the
foregoing discussion. The first issue is security of tenure, followed
by the debate on decentralization with special attention to some
recent expériences with special forms of co-management.
Security of tenure
The literature en land tenure in developing countries is replète
with références to the relationship between land tenure and
Investment in land: "It is a sufficient incentive for a land user to
know that he/she has total command of the available resources
and their products." 17. The question is which légal incentives
have been experienced to increase tenure security, whose security
has been improved and with what impact on the environment ?
National législation
It is not surprising that national législations are often considered
as a major source of insecurity. The majority of environmental-
17 Otkoth-Ogendo 1994:27.
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related laws are blamed for almost everything that may go
wrong:
• they are outdated and enforcement is very weak 1̂
• they are nonexistent or inadequate in some sectors, and very
frag-mentary 197
• they are centralistic, coercive and authoritarian,
• they lack clear rights over trees to individuals and
communities, and neglect the complex tenure situation of
pastoralists 2Qf
• they reflect a conflict between conservation and production 21,
and last but not least,
• they are not enough market-oriented 22.
As a result of such and other serious criticism, many studies
recommend more or less radical law reforms.
Privatization
The land tenure reform in Kenya is possibly the example of law
reform towards private property that has been most examined
23. The following citation may be illustrative for the largely
negative impact on tenure security of privatization programs in
Africa: "Not only has the governments program proved difficult
to carry out, leaving control of the land substantially in the
hands of local elders, but it has led to numerous conflicts whose
resolutions tend to favour the wealthy and influential,
stimulated the growth of a largely unregulated market in land,
18 Sudan: cf. Johnson and Ofosu-Amaah 1982.
1° Ghana and Malaysia: cf. Gruppe and Ofosu-Amaah 1981a,b; Sahel:
CILSS 1988.
20 Hesseling and Ba 1994, and several reports on Forest Codes : Du
Saussay 1986; Elbow and Rochegude 1990; McLain 1992,1993.
21 Bell and Hotchkiss 1989.
22 World Bank and, in a different way, related to rural wood markets,
Bertrand and Madon, 1993.
23 Shipton 1988, Heuret 1988, Haugerud 1989, Scherr 1989, Carter,
Wiebe & Blarel 1991.
weakened the security of tenure for smallholders, and led to a
degree of concentration of ownership or control, both according to
wealth and gender - all without facilitating the granting of
credit or leading to the increases in production that had been
envisioned."24 In a case study on Rwanda, Catherine André
(1994 :199-214) shows that even if customary tenure Systems are
evolving towards individualization, the imposition of formal
land titles by law has rather ambiguous conséquences for the
rural population. Other expériences led to more or less similar
conclusions 25.
Vulnérable social catégories
But national législations with a less capitalist character, hâve
neither unambiguously a positive impact on tenure security,
especially with regard to vulnérable social catégories, such as
smallholders, women, pastoralists or immigrants.
Examples in this respect are plethoric, but let me just name one
view. In Senegal, the Loi sur le Domaine National (Law on thé
National Domain), enacted in 1964, was an attempt to place thé
best aspects of customary tenure Systems on a modem egalitarian
and democratie foundation. Bloch (1993) studied thé changes in
access to land in small irrigated perimeters, related to caste
structure and gender. He sometimes found improvement for
dispossessed groups, but the most striking development worked
in thé other direction, which is that a new land controlling élite
appropriated substantial amounts of irrigable land for itself. In
thé same line, Famoriyo (1987) and Omotola (1986) conclude
that thé Nigérian Land Use Act of 1978 has worked largely in
favour of traditional rulers and against thé interests of
smallholders.
Laws governing land tenure and narural resources are generally
'gender-neutral', making no explicit distinction between men and
women. But apparently neutral laws can establish or encourage
de facto discrimination against women, especially as they
24 Reyna and Downs 1988:4.
25 See for ex. Fisyi 1992 on Cameroon; Crousse and Hesseling 1994 on
Mauritania.
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rarely contain provisions designed to counter discrimination and
to improve tenure security for women.2^.
National laws mainly focus on erop farming and forestry and, to
some extent, on fishery and water management. Pastoralists in
Africa in particular, have been negatively impacted by the
imposition of national tenure Systems which in many cases have
served to marginalize nomadic population. In Somalia, the
relationship between indigenous pastoralist tenure and state-
imposed tenure has, in many locations, decreased the ability of
pastoralism to reproduce itself, thereby compromising the
rational utilization of very large areas of rangeland interior,
which have very few alternative uses. 27 Venema (1995)
describes an example in Morocco, where government
interventions in collaboration with a World Bank project,
disfavour thé less influential, notably thé immigrant herdsmen.
Forestry
Tenure security to land and security of tree tenure are closely
related. In agroforestry, clear tenure rules, assuring thé farmer
that the trees planted on thé holding will belong to thé farmer,
are important. Bruce and Fortmann (1989 : 4) provide a good
overview of thé problems related to property and forestry :
"People who have been exposed only to thé more familiär forms
of Western property law often assume that trees are part and
parcel of the land on which they grow (...) but many tenure
Systems confer property rights in standing trees quite différent
from the land en which they stand and may confer those rights
on someone other than thé landholder." 28
State législation and policies may often hâve a serious impact
on thé security of tree tenure for thé individual man or woman or
local communities depending partly on trees and forests for their
living. "Often the state advances the claim that it owns ail
uncultivated land, frequently in concert with thé principle that
individuals can establish their claims to land by clearing it"29.
The transfer of property rights from traditional user groups to
26 See Konaté ,1992, on thé Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform in Burkina
Faso.
27 Unruh 1995.
28 See also Fortmann and Riddell 1988; Fortmann and Bruce 1988.
29 Bruce and Fortmann 1989:4.
others éliminâtes the incentives for monitoring and restrained
use^O. Famous examples of such policies leading to deforestation
are given by Binswanger (1987) for thé Brazilian Amazon, and
Rassam (1990) for Ivory Coast. In many former French colonies in
Africa forest management policy is based principally on
régulation of use through enforcement of restrictions, within thé
forest reserves but also with regard to trees on individual farms.
Together with many rnisinterpretations by thé mighty but at the
same time poorly equipped forest service, thé resuit is the
absence of security for individuals and groups on trees and
forests. 31
The impression of the foregoing is rather pessimistic. National
laws, whether they are orientated to private or state property,
whether they give room for local rules or not, apparently are ro
good incentive to equaEy increase thé tenure security of natural
resources, and thus improve their local management; they are
mainly seen as a fundamental barrier to encourage Community
environmental efforts. In many countries (notably in thé Sahel)
promising reforms of environmental législation hâve recently
been adopted or are under their way, taking into account most of
the critiques expressed in the case studies. It is yet too early to
measure their impact on the security of tenure.
Décentralisation: Some Expériences
with Comanagement
Without going into details on the theoretical and technical
distinctions between decentralization, déconcentration and
dévolution, I will define decentralization as the transfer of
regulatory and executive compétence to local authorities, the
central government retaining a limited supervisory rôle.
Applied to the management of natural resources
decentralization implies that certain guide-Unes are formulated
at national level e.g. in a legislative framework and that a
national policy plan is then set out and implemented at regional
30 McKean an Ostrom 1995: 5.
31 For examples on Land, Trees and Tenure bom Africa, Asia and Latin
America, see Raintree 1987. See also Kessler & Wiersum 1995 with regard
to the Sahel.
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and local level, which can be specially adapted and fleshed out
according to local circumstances.32
The question is whether through decentralization incentives can
be generated to more efficiënt resource utilization and protection.
In an interview published in African Farmer from October 1993,
Ghana's minister of environment is asked the following question
: "How do you go about trying to get farmers to change their
practices (...) ? Is it simply éducation, or are there also
incentives to farm more intensively ?" Her reaction is simple and
clear : "I think decentralization is the answer."
Indeed, recent research in developing countries suggests that
environmental stratégies built on sound, widely respected local
practices and institutions better serve policy goals of sustainable
development.33 Such suggestions seem to assume the présence of
local organisations with a long shared history and well-
established nonns and institutions. A recent research en thé rôle
of law in thé protection of thé tropical forest in Ecuador's
Amazon région34 shows, however, that local social organization
must be conceived of as lying on a continuüm with on the one hand
the extreme situation of heterogenous, instable societies
('immature' communities), and at the other end 'mature'
communities of long historical depth, strong relations of
reciprocity, a common culture and a functioning social control
System with generally accepted noims and legitimate
institutions. The impact of decentralized législation is also
fonction of thé 'autonomy' of légal administration from political
and social pressures. Hère too, thé authors propose to consider
thé position of thé local bureacracy on a continuüm from a very
low to a very high autonomy.
32 Hesseling 1994 :132-133.
33 Vermillion 1994 on irrigation turnover with examples from Asia,
Africa and Latin America; see also Sheperd 1992 on Afnca's forests; on
joint management of forests in Asia, see Pardo 1993 [Népal], Sharma 1991,
Roy 1992, Hobley 1992 [India] and Van Ginneken & Thongmee 1991
[Thailand]; Gilmour e.a., 1989 and Fisher 1993 on indigenous forest
management in Népal; Stocking 1989 on Community land-use planning in
Lesotho; v.d. Hoek 1992 on local level land use programmes in Indonesia;
Sibanda 1995 on thé Zimbabwe Carnpfire approach; Cemea 1994 on
rangeland and water use in Senegal, andmany others.
34 Taale & Griffïths 1995.
In général thé literature on local participation in natural
resource management is abundant and this is not the place for an
extensive discussion on thé observed problems and solutions.
Instead I will discuss some récent expériences with
comanagement of natural resources to examine if they provide
légal and institutional incentives for local communities to better
use their natural resources.
The "Gestion de terroir" Approach
Over the last decade, the Gestion de terroir approach has
become very populär among national governments, donor agencies
(including thé World Bank) and NGO's, especially in thé former
French colonies in Sahelian West Africa. The concept of terroir
has been developed by French geographers, based on features of
sedentary agricultural communities. The terroir is seen as
linking thé Community and its "useful environment" 3^.
It is however difficult to give a clear définition of the Gestion de
terroir approach, because it encloses in practice a considérable
variety of institutional forms, stratégies and activities.3f> In thé
only area of Mali-Sud, Joldersma e.a. (1994) distinguish six
différent Gestion de terroir -programmes with particular
features. But thé approach is considered to be global,
multisectoral, integrated, participatory and long-term.37
Although little distinction is made between thé terms
aménagement and gestion de terroir, they actually refer to two
closely related but distinctive activities : aménagement aims a t
a division of the territory on the basis of natural resources and
involves technical activities in thé form of plans, whereas
gestion refers to thé socio-économie, juridical and organizational
aspects allowing for an efficient use and control of the natural
resources by thé local Community. I will mainly emphasize thé
second set of aspects.
At present, all Gestion de terroir -projects are still in an
expérimental phase and at thé starting point of Implementation.
It is thus not surprising that thé results are not yet fully
35 Painter e.a. 1994.
36 Kessler & Wiersma 1995 :12.
37 Painter e.a. 1994: 451.
Gerti Hesseling Légal and Institutional...
114
documented, but on the basis of the available case study
literature a first glance at the promises and limitations of the
approach is possible 38.
Despite some promising results, most authors on case studies are
quite critical in their analyses of the Gestion de terroir -
approach. Let me just list the most striking shortcomings which
have been raised.
Tenture security
Due to its methodological weakness, the approach does not
substantially contribute to clarifying the complex tenure security
System As Marchai (1993) states : "Gestion de Terroir
programmes are build on a backdrop of tenure insecurity".
Furthermore, the approach does not fully acknowledge the
importance of more mobile modes of resources management. There
is indeed a tendency to close the frontiers of the village and to
exclude the less-rooted users of the natural resources, such as
migrants and transhumant pastoralists. And when the position
of women improves, it concerns only women belonging to the
sedentary farmers' community. As a conséquence the approach is
not suited for pastoral areas.39
Organizational aspects
Gestion de terroir -programmes involve thé création of new local
organizations of a représentative nature. Thèse management
committees are sometimes mère instruments to obtain fonds and
they are created to please outside donors. They are often lacking
both officiai récognition and local légitimation.40 In fact, thé
approach offers no institutional guarantees that benefits will be
equally distributed, as thé institutions are still depending on
social and political power relations. The often problematic and
conflictuous relations between thé involved public services, and
especially thé dominant position of the agricultural service, are
a serious hindrance for thé Implementation. Finally, to date,
numerous terroir -programmes are limited to a single village
denying thé importance of intervillage natural resources.
38 Engberg-Pedersen 1995 on Burkina Faso; Marchai 1993, Joldersma e.a
1994, and Benjaminsen 1995 on Mali; van den Briel e.a. 1994 on Niger;
and Travaux de Recherche Développement 1993 on 13 case studies in
Africa and Malagasy.




Impact on environmental management
The most sévère notice concerns the impact of thé Gestion de
terroir -approach on environmental management. With regard to
the reforestry project in Téra (Niger) where thé approach ha s
been adopted in 1990, Van den Briel e.a. (1994) conclude, in spite
of some promising results : "However, thé activities undertaken
do not necessarily contribute to a more sustainable land
management, and some could even be harmful." According to
Engberg-Pedersen (1995: 16), there is an obvious incongruity
between thé issues emphasized by thé villagers (asking for
short-term manifest results such as infrastructure) and thé (long-
term) focus upon national resources in the programmes.
According to this interprétation of the case studies, the Gestion
de terroir -approach apparently does not yet score points on
crucial topics as security of tenure, thé status of vulnérable social
catégories and sustainable management of natural resources. So,
do we have to write it off? I think this would be premature and I
have several reasons to see enough deeming features.
Firstly, an important strong point of the Gestion de terroir
approach is, according to Kessler and Wiersma (1995: 14) the
fact that the natural resources are looked upon in a holistic way.
It gives attention to the need for organization of the village, the
technical (government) services, and their interactions, and the
change of füll management responsibilities towards the local
land users. Where technical solutions may not always be
available, the result of better mutual understanding is already a
great achievement, where objectives by developers and by target
groups have so often been widely apart.
Secondly, the authors actually also did mention some real
promising developments as a result of the programmes. In settled
agricultural communities the behaviour of the villagers towards
a more conscious use of natural resources has been observed, as a
result of their improved knowledge of the environment, the
participation of the local people was considerably increased in
every step of the process, including planning and évaluation, and
the approach also allowed a more adequate response to local
needs and interests. Finally, we have to bear in mind that the
methodology of the approach is still in füll évolution, which




At this stage however, the case studies do not provide enough
évidence to conclude that the approach générâtes valuable legal
and institutional incentives for local environmental
management. In my opinion this can mainly be attributed to the
(understandable) focus on technical interventions and a certain
neglect of the legal and institutional prerequisites. The process
of giving users access to and control over local resources is a long
and complex process. The Gestion de terroir -approach is
certainly not a ready-to-use model of decentralized resource
management and it is not easily reproducible in every area. But
it may have enough potential to meet the local environmental
problems in a well defined context, provided that the
methodology will be progressively improved and the flexibility
increased.
The Contractual Approach
In the current discussion about improved management of land and
natural resources, local management contracts are increasingly
considered as a valuable option. To date, few experiments with
local management contracts have been fully documented;
consequentiy there is little évidence to evaluate the long-term
rôle, impact or sustainability of those contracts.
Bruce e.a. (1995) describe experiments with approaches to
common property forestry in China. According to the authors,
the "lack of law" in China's legal culture does not prevent but
rather facilitâtes expérimentation. "Contracts have played a
major rôle in filling gaps in both the law of property and the law
of associations, with charters and agreements used to define
instihitions and leases used to customize tenure arrangements."
(p. 48). At the same time they plead for greater legal
formalization, "both to consolidate organizational forms and
property rights and to buttress them against policy fluctuations
and attempts at excessive régulation by government which
undermine the new autonomy and incentives." (p. 48).
In Mali, contracting local management conventions forms an
integral part of the decentralization policy with regard to
natural resources. As in the beginning of the 90s, the Land Law
and the Forestry Code were in a process of reform, the drawing
up of local rules for resource management was allo wed by the
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authorities by way of exception. To my knowledge, just one
experiment with this kind of conventions has been documented
41. It concerns a convention involving six villages in the
management of the "brousse" (common property resources - f orest
and pasture - 3n the "bush"). The negotiations to arrive at a
draft convention took years, mainly because of the following
factors :
(1) difficulties in convincing the villagers to limit their
activities with regard to their resources;
(2) some villages had to give up part of their resources in favour
of less gifted villages;
(3) the élaboration of a system of control and sanctions,
(4) the low priées of wood as a disincentive for Investments in
the maintenance of the forests and pastures, and
(5) the résistance of local forest agents and civil servants to
really transfer part of their powers to the villages.
The draft convention still needs the support of a professional
lawyer in order to be designed in proper juridical terms. And the
sometimes vehement discussions with the official parties in
order to overcome their résistance seriously slow down the
process of operationalization. But the process of negotiation in
itself (involving not only the six villages, but also civil servants
and external donors) constitutes a promising resuit of the
contractual approach.
Contractual arrangements are not always considered as a
valuable option. In his reaction on thé draft version of this
article, Trond Vedeld wonders whether thé situation in thé
Sahel is mature for a contractual approach, considering its
development level, its légal system, its lack of jurisprudence en
laws that hâve long existed (developed by thé French), its lack
of predictable law enforcement, its lack of constitutional
(democratie) gevernement, and its lack of Rule of Law. Although
I do not deny the serious constraints resulting from the yet
imperfect functioning of the Sahelian states, the questioning of
41 Hilhorst and Coulibaly 1995,1996.
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the maturity of the local communities for management contracte
seems to me an inappropriate approach. African communities
have indeed a long tradition of contracts and 'indigenous'
contract procedures. The classical example in the Sahel is the
contrat de fumure between pastoralists and farmers. Por central
Africa, Achim von Oppen has drawn my attention to early
travellers' reports on contract ceremonies in the 19th Century.42
As the above example from Mali has shown, the contracrual
approach in itself is not so much the crucial stumbling block, but
the willingness of state représentatives and the actual
functioning of state institutions. In this sense I do agrée with
Vedeld that a predictable and fair legal System is an important
precondition for sustainable use of resources.
De Zeeuw (forthcoming), also states that the contractual
approach is not always a good solution. He refers to oral
borrowing arrangements with regard to land currently applied in
some parts of Burkina Faso. In this context, the introduction of
formal borrowing contacts might even seriously undermine the
security of access to land for the borrowers, disturbing the social
relationship between the contracting parties. His argument that
some local types of tenure labelled as insecure, may be perceived
by the local population as secure, is confirmed by other research
43. And I do agrée that in such situations formalization of tenure
arrangements may have unintended, negative side effects.
However, in certain situations, especially in situations of rapid
changes and transition, the contractual approach may have
advantages and provide positive legal and institutional
incentives for local management. Indeed, the contractual
approach offers flexibility in:
• thenumber of parties involved. For example, it could make i t
easier to involve thé appropriate groups, e.g. seasonal users of a
natural resource, plus local NGOs and private producers groups;
42 An example from Arnot (1889, reprod. 1969, p. 154) : "(H)e gave rœa
receipt for thé ox in füll as if I had bought and paid for it. This he did, as is
thé custom amongst thé Chibokwe, by first dedaring the matter to his
people, then taking a twig, breaking it in two and throwing a part over
each shoulder. The whole twig in front of him represented thé question on
hand; the twig broken and cast behind thé chief's back, the question
decided and forgotten." See also Von Oppen 1993.
See for an example in a quite différent context White and Runge 1995.43
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• protecting 'bundles of rights' of various users groups. While
property rights (which in the long term make land registration)
establish the rights of one person or one group, a contract can
handle situations involving 'bundles of rights' and a variety of
user groups;
• duration of the contract. In situations of rapid developments, a
contract can yet guarantee users the benefits of their Investments,
as long as they fulfil their obligations.
• tailoring contract stipulations to spécifie local situations.
Additional advantages are:
• certain stipulations could be used to lay down the rights and
obligations of all parties;
• a contract can be better adapted to local conditions; in
particular, it can contain a clause creating thé possibility of,
under spécifie conditions, breaking open the contract and
reopening negotiations;
• agreement of local contacts with regional and national policy
can be assured by standard incorporation of the obligation that
these must fit within the local policy plans, since this must be in
accord with the framework of regional and national policy plans
(Hesseling 1994a and Picciotto 1992).
In conclusion, contacts may contribute to creating a socially
broad basis for new policies, because parties have more influence
on, and are with respect to content also more interested in the
outcome as in the case of government régulations. That does not
alter the fact that important juridical and institutional
conditions are yet to be fulfilled in present day Africa to really
make the contractual approach a workable option for local
environmental management.
Legal Incentives:
Some Remarks for Discussion
In conclusion I will make some more général remarks for
discussion, with regard to three items : (1) thé importance of
Légal and Institutional...
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national législation for security of tenure; (2) thé social working
of law; and (3) decentralization.
The importance of national législation for security of tenure
In a rather schematic way, we may distinguish three situations
of national laws in relation to tenure security.
1. National laws are often considered as a disincentive for tenure
security. If this is the case, reforms may be indicated to break
down the legal barriers and formalize clearly defined and
legally defensible rights to land and natural resources.
2. In other cases, national laws do not have a real impact en
local tenure Systems which are perceived by local communities
as 'secure'. This is particularly the case when national
authorities remain at distance or are incapable to implement
législation at the local level. In times of stability, those laws
may be 'neutral' in the sensé that they are not an incentive and
neither a disincentive for tenure security. But in times of conflict
and rapid changes, thé same law may become a constraint for
better local management and then thé need for law reform may
occur.
3. Sometimes, thé confusion created by (impropriate) national
laws or thé 'lack of law' may give room for local experiments
and stratégies. In times of profound transition non-reform
approaches to apparent tenure constraints may be recommended.
The debate public versus private ownership seems to be a never-
ending one, but as Bromley (1992: 468) states : "The nominal
property structure (whether something is held as private
property, as state property, or as common property) is less
important for managerial performance than is the effectiveness
of thé authority System (thé rights and duties) that
accompanies a particular property régime. In this respect we
hâve to remind thé remark of Cernea, quoted before, that state
laws are to guarantee, reinforce, and suffen the back bone of even
the lowest local resources management system. And they can
only fulfil this 'mission' if the gap between thé formal legal
situation and thé cornmunity-based Systems is phased out. This
means that the lawmaker in most developing countries is
confronted with thé challenge of building their légal System on a
double foundation : the useful éléments of the local values in
their society and thé achievements of modem législations.
Reminding Smith's remark on external incentives, cited before,
that thé ingrédients for change have to be present in order to
function as a catalyst, légal reform should mainly concentrate en
facilitating changes that are already going on in the society".
The social working of law
National authorities take in général an instrumental and
positivist approach, based on thé idea that législation is
capable of influencing social behaviour. Law is regarded as an
instrument of social change. Législation is meant to adapt thé
behaviour of citizens and make it consistent with thé law. But
thé reality is quite différent. The behaviour of individual and
groups is in first instance regulated by a complex web of
reciprocal relationships and social fields, and they are guided
more by thé social and cultural standards valid in their own
Community. National laws are not the sole source of change in
behaviour with regard to natural resource management. In
pluralist societies, thé social working of law must be taken into
account and this means that the legislator must take a
sociological approach in shaping new environmental laws. But
once a new law has been adopted, thé légal messages rarely
reach thé population in an undistorted form (they are
misinterpreted or transformed). At that stage account must be
taken of the social factors that détermine how far local
communities can 'internalize' it (in particular, their capacity to
understand thé text of a law correctly and to take position
according to thé priorities of their local environment). In short,
thé effects of new environmental laws (and thus of their ability
to play a rôle as incentive for local environmental management)
dépend more on thé motivation and situation of social agents
than thé intentions of the legislator. 44
Decentralization
Is decentralization thé miracle remedy for a better management
of local resources? Of course not. Although expectations of
decentralization are sometimes extremely high, its dangers and
pitfalls are often grossly underestimated. As a resuit of the
pressure of donors on developing countries to reduce state
intervention, they are in danger of accepting decentralization in
theory, but of doing little to flesh it out in practice. If thé policy
44 Griffiths 1992; Messetag & Le Roy 1990, Mathieu 1990.
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of decentralization is introduced too rapidly, there is the risk of
actually reinforcing existing patronage relations or hierarchical
social structures. And in a period of structural adjustment
programmes, the will to decentralize natural resource
management is likely to consist merely of off-loading some of the
State's more costly responsibilities onto the peasant's backs. The
adaptability faculty of local tenure Systems is unevenly spread
among the many different local communities. Strengthening
local capacities is therefore a necessary accompaniment to any
decentralization measure. But all those potential dangers do not
alter the appropriateness of the maxim put forward by Oakerson
(1988: 151) : "Don't destroy the base. Décide what part of the
existing structure of society constitutes a useful base, and seek to
preserve and build upon it". At the same time : "The local level
dérives strength not just from its 'localness' and seif Containment,
but from the extent to which the supralocal levels stand behind
it, and legitimize and empower it." 45
Legal and institutional incentives for
local environmental management?
My interest in legal and institutional incentives for local
environmental management started after a rather trivial but
familiär dispute between what I always jokingly call "boffins" -
technical experts - and what they call - not always as a joke -
"softies", more focusing on thé social fabric than on thé technical
package with regard to natural resources. But an analysis in
terms of incentives bears the risk to be a misleading one for its
suggestion of an incentive starts a linear type of social process:
thé incentive resulting in a predictable response from the
individual or thé community.
The empirical studies focusing on the different legal and
institutional stratégies adopted to improve the management of
natural resources at the local level, and reviewed in aie second
section, have indeed revealed that rulemaking (state laws or
customary laws, at a national or at a decentralised level) will
not automatically générale incentives for certain kinds of
activities or discourage actors from other kinds of behaviour.
45 Cernea 1994 :189.
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To avoid simplistic arguments leading to a blueprint approach
with respect to rules and institutions, several bodies of socio-
légal theory have been called for help.
Firstly, according to thé socio-légal theory of land tenure, the
déniai of the relatively efficient, dynamic and legitimate
nature of local tenure practices and thé centralistic character of
modem law Systems have been identified as important
explanatory factors for thé fact that modem land laws provide
so few safeguards for local people which undermines their
potential of incentive for a better management of natural
resources. Thus, a prerequisite for légal incentives in local land
management is that they are flexible and adapted to fit thé
various local tenure practices.
Secondly, an analysis in terms of incentives has to be situated in
a perspective of thé social working of law, including thé
stratégies developed by thé (wo)men at the shopfloor in
response to the incentive on the basis of their culture (nonns,
rules, social relations etc.), thé spécifie characteristics of the
resource involved, thé social and political context and so on.
Thus, thé degree of success of external norms varies greatly,
depending on the context in which they must work.
Thirdly, in thé current debate on institutions as sets of rules, thé
theory of common property resources appears to be a substantial
contribution to a better understanding of legal and institutional
incentives in local management. It warns us that local
organizations hâve to be nested within a set of larger
organizations and authorities, including the state, for dealing
with problems byond thé boundaries of the community.
The conclusion of this intellectual exercise with thé concept of
légal and institutional incentives may be somewhat
disappointing: thé point of departure being very général, thé
conclusion becomes also général.
Indeed, my réaction to my colleague's statement would be that
laws and institutions appear to be at the same time incentives
and disincentives for local environmental management and
therefore interventions in thé sphère of lawmaking at all levels
will remain indispensable. The potential to create légal and
institutional incentives for local environmental management i s
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undoubtedly present in national législation, in decentralized
management structures and in local contracts and agreements.
There is no need to make a choice between these three
approaches which may coexist within the same legal system.
Methods and stratégies of the approaches have to be continually
improved and adapted to new challenges by taking into account
social, technical and political factors. And finally, legal and
institutional instruments alone will never generate enough
incentives to change the environmental behaviour of local
communities They have to be accompanied by technical
innovations, economie and social incentives.
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